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Chappefl's Ltd. v. County of Cape Breton, [1963] S.C.R. 340.
No difficult point of law faced the court in Chappe~ls Ltd. v.
Municipality of County of Cape Breton, but rather a question of what
relationships between the parties concerned was established by the
evidence. Speaking for the Court Martland J. found the facts were that
Mclnnes the foreman of the appellants who were engaged in repairing
a municipal building requested George Garland to solder a hole in the
roof. Mclnnes did this upon instructions from Carmichael the county
clerk. Garland's son James in the negligent performance of the work
caused the building to be set on fire.
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal1 found that the work to be
done by James Garland was inherently dangerous and as a result
the appellant was caught by the exception to the general rule that
a person is not responsible for the negligence of an independent contractor employed by him.
Martland J. disagreed with the characterization of the relationship found by the Court of Appeal to exist between the appellant and
George Garland. First, he points out that the work to be done by
George Garland was not covered by any contract between the appellant and the respondent municipality. Not only was it not established
that a contract for the work existed between the litigants, but in the
opinion of Martland J. no contract could be inferred "from the converstion between Mclnness and George Garland." 2 There were two
equally plausible inferences to draw from the evidence: (1) that
the county clerk had asked the appellant to undertake the additional
repairs as a matter of contract, or (2) that the county clerk had
simply asked the appellant's foreman to engage another to do the
work for the municipality directly. The non-existence of any contract
for the particular work between appellant and respondent makes it
unlikely the first inference should be accepted. But even if this inference is drawn, Martland J. considers a careful distinction must be
made between the liability of a contractor who has subcontracted
work which he was obliged to do himself, and liability of a contractor
for work which the owner required to be done but which the contractor was not himself liable to perform. Thus the issue was narrowed
down to this question:
.. the extent of the duty owed to a claimant by a person who contracts

with an independent contractor to do work not for himself but for the
claimant at the claimant's request, if the claimant's own property is
then damaged because of negligence on the part of the independent
contractor who is working on it.3

The duty, in the Court's view, is no more than the "exercise
of reasonable care in the selection of a competent independent contractor to do the work." 4
1 (1962) 36 D.L.R. (2d) 58.
2 [1963J S.C.R.
3 Ibid., p. 346.

4 Ibid.

at p. 344.

Supreme Court Review

1964]

With respect, it is submitted the nice distinction drawn by Martland J. between contractors liable to do the work themselves and
those liable only to have it done by others has no justification in the
normal factual situation. The reliance in both instances is the same.
General contractors could have avoided liability by insisting that the
owners make direct contracts with subcontractors whose selection
they might advise. This distinction reduces the already fading margin
of liability for the work of independent contractors.

Caine Fur Farms Ltd. v. Kokolsky, [1963] S.C.R. 315.
What is the liability of a dog owner for damage done by his dog
when it is allowed to run free?
This issue was raised before the Supreme Court of Canada in
the recently-decided case of Caine Fur Farms Limited v. Kokolsky. 1
The case involved the owners of two adjoining mink farms. The
defendant, Caine Fur Farms Ltd., in contravention of a provincial
statute and a municipal by-law, had allowed its dog to run at large
during the whelping season, a time when female mink are easily agitated and if upset have a tendency to destroy their young. The dog
got into plaintiff's compound and climbed on the tops of mink cages,
causing the mink to destroy a large number of their young.
It was argued on behalf of the defendant that as the dog was
a domestic animal, liability for damages caused by it could only
arise if scienter were proved. Furthermore it was argued that, since
dogs do not by the common law make their owners strictly liable for
trespass, in the present case the defendant could not be held liable
for the damage resulting from the dog's trespass.
The Court had little difficulty in dealing with these arguments.
Relying on two cases, Farden v. Harcourt-Rivington,2 a House of
Lords decision, and Fleming v. Atkinson,3 a decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada, it reaffirmed the principle that, in dealing with
cases of animal damage and animal trespass, negligence was a completely separate cause of action, to which the ordinary defences of
the common law relating to animal damage and animal trespass did
not apply. From this point the Court had no difficulty in finding that,
in the circumstances, between the two mink farmers, there was a
duty to keep the dog restrained, since the presence of a strange dog
might agitate the mink. Letting the dog run at large is a breach
of duty and the defendant is liable for the resulting damage.
1

[1963] S.C.R. 315.

.2 (1932) 146 L.T. 391.
3 [1959] S.C.R. 513.

